![]() Finally, the analogy improves the understanding of security dynamics in a system in which capabilities are distributed among various actors. Thus, it captures two of the most important peacetime cyber challenges-cybercrime and cyber-enabled economic espionage. Next, it focuses on a key aspect of the mercantilist system-that is, the economic and political realms are not differentiated. First, it gives an insight into a system in which lines between state and non-state actors are blurred. The analogy can shed light on specific aspects of the cyber challenge. By examining the historical trajectory of privateering, we can learn from the intended and unintended consequences that the presence of such actors produced. Conceptually, the analogy points to the differing degrees of involvement and control that states can have with actors who exploit largely ungoverned spaces, such as the cyber domain. It makes recourse to an older world in which states were weak players when it came to the exploitation of the seas. The analogy is both historical and conceptual. Thus, the opportunities and risks of using privateers can be explained with the aid of historical examples, and the information can then be applied to the modern-day problems of the cyber realm. ![]() The institution of privateering can shed light on the aligned and conflicting incentives involved for both state and non-state parties, when defensive and offensive regimes are in place and where the responsibilities of both actors are blurred. At the same time, non-state actors are exploiting the insecurities of cyberspace, with the potential disregard of state versus state normative frameworks. Protection from threats propagating through cyberspace has been treated as a predominantly private undertaking. A similar struggle is taking place today in cybersecurity. Privateering evolved from an institution that profited merchants and the Crown to one posing a threat to English naval dominance. 4Ī longitudinal view of history is necessary to understand the development of norms against privateering. 3 Thus, it may be important to explore what can be learned from the rich history of privateering, in this instance mainly from British maritime history. 2 At the same time, various experts have used the analogy to describe the collusion between attackers and states. ![]() Scholars have used the analogy to privateering to recommend, or dismiss, the issuance of letters of marque to private companies in cyberspace. This chapter argues that the study of the historical evolution of the private system of force in maritime history offers important lessons for analyzing and shaping the evolution of cybersecurity. On the contrary, once a private system of force was created, states were not able to control the use of force completely. However, the historical record indicates that such norms did not develop quickly nor was the process of attaining them a peaceful one. ![]() Policymakers’ hopefulness about the analogy to the seas is understandable maritime trade is relatively peaceful after all. Mike Rogers also referred to maritime norms when thinking about norm development for cyberspace. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia in 2015, Adm. 1 He suggested that similar norms of the maritime environment were needed in cyberspace. Two months after the 2007 cyber attacks on the small Baltic country of Estonia, Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo used the analogy to privateering in a speech, pointing to the 1856 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law that abolished privateering. Florian Egloff, a Clarendon Scholar, is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Doctoral Training in Cyber Security and a research affi liate at the Cyber Studies Programme in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. ![]()
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